

<b>e-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie</b>	<b>THE TWO COMPLEMENTARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE BODY-MIND-WORLD PROBLEM AND ON HUMAN ACTION von Hans-Ulrich Hoche</b>
--	--

## Summary

As for the body-mind-world relation, two pseudo-problems tend to impose themselves upon us (1). – The time-honoured mind-body pseudo-problem (1.1). – The mind-world pseudo-problem (1.2). – The body-consciousness-world problem as seen from the third- and the first-person perspectives (2). – The scientific body-consciousness-world problem (2.1). – The phenomenological body-consciousness-world problem. Changing philosophical amazement into insight (2.2). – Human action in the third- and the first-person perspectives (3). – The actions of others as seen from my point of view. Overt behaviour (3.1). – My own actions as seen from my point of view. Gerundive features of my noematic phenomena (3.2). – Actions and intentions in action (3.3). – The complementarity of freedom and determinism in human action (3.4). – A plea for the coexistence of the two complementary perspectives (4). – Why the third-person perspective seems to be 'the scientifically correct' one (4.1). – However, the first- and the third-person perspectives do not contradict each other; so there is no question of a primacy among them (4.2). – We are in need of a novel conceptualisation of the phenomena of so-called 'psychophysical interaction' (5). – Perceiving and acting are no proper examples for an alleged psychophysical interaction (5.1). – The placebo effect. Views of some medical experts (5.2). – *Subjective* effects of placebo treatments (5.3). – *Objective* effects of placebo treatments (5.4) – Causation as a flux of energy *versus* Humean causation (5.5). – 'Moore's see-saw'. 'The work of analysis and distinction is often very difficult' (5.6). – The human and the divine points of view (6). – The origin of the world as seen from the human and the divine angles (6.1). – The world of science and our personal life-worlds (6.2).

### 1. Pseudo-problems concerning the relations between body, consciousness, and the world

Strictly speaking, the headline of this essay is incorrect; for there is not 'the' – that is to say: not just *one* – body-mind-world problem. Rather, there are *two* genuine problems besides the much more familiar pseudo-problem concerning the relations between body, consciousness, and the world. Furthermore, in all three cases the relation between body and consciousness and the relation between consciousness and the world as a rule are discussed separately, whereas the relation between body and world is mostly taken for granted and therefore neglected.

Ironically, though on plausible psychological grounds, it has regularly been the pseudo-problem most of us automatically think of whenever the terms 'body-mind-world problem' or, in the usual narrowing down, 'mind-body problem' is being thrown into philosophical and scientific debates.

**1.1.** This can be seen already in the following passage from Saint Augustine, which has proved to be enormous influential up to now:

Modus quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus [...] omnino mirus est nec comprehendi ab homine potest – et hoc ipse homo est': 'The manner in which minds adhere to bodies is altogether enigmatic and cannot be comprehended by man – and this is man himself (*De civitate Dei*: XXI, 10).

Similarly, and expressly referring to Augustine, Blaise Pascal stated in his *Pensées*:

What makes our inability to apprehend things complete is that they are simple in themselves and that we are composed of two opposite and essentially diverse natures, soul and body [...],

spirit and matter [...]. This mixture [ce mélange-là] [...] is [...] what we understand less than anything else. Man is to himself the most amazing object of nature; for he cannot conceive what the body is, and still less what the spirit is, and least of all how a body can be united with a spirit. This is the summit of his difficulties, and yet this is his own being.<sup>1</sup>

In our time, Josef Seifert, following Bonaventura and John Henry Cardinal Newman,<sup>2</sup> goes as far as to consider this seemingly impossible fact a manifestation of divine omnipotence:

[T]he fact of the "transition", the "connection" between the nervous system and the soul, is incomprehensible and a thoroughly *inexplicable* natural "miracle" [..]. Certainly it is already surprising that physiological occurrences in the body can have "psychic effects". But that purely causal occurrences in the body can enter into relations with the fundamentally different, sense-imbued reality of the perception of the external world – that is, taken all by itself, an argument for the existence of God.<sup>3</sup>

Having in view what I tried to make clear in Hoche 2008: Essays IV–V, we should find it easy to spot the origin of such considerations. It is a confounding of two complementary perspectives incompatible with each other, to wit, the first-person and the third-person perspectives – a confounding which, after all, might seem to be justified on the ground that, contrary impressions notwithstanding, human beings – even though in a unique way – make up a natural kind.<sup>4</sup> Or, as Sartre concisely put it: The insurmountable difficulties in question result from the attempt to unite my consciousness not with *my* body (as I experience it myself) but with the body *of others* (as I can perceive it).<sup>5</sup>

**1.2.** Similarly, the relation between consciousness and the world (or rather the objects singled or, as it were, crystallised out from it) more often than not has been discussed in the form of what I take to be a mere pseudo-problem. What I have in mind is the frequently posed question of how consciousness, being something 'internal', is in a position to 'transcend itself' and get hold on the essentially different and 'consciousness-independent'<sup>6</sup> material objects of the 'external' world. What is presupposed in this time-honoured style of dealing with the 'transcendence of consciousness' has still been shared even by Sartre, who, notably in his notorious 'ontological proof' ('preuve

<sup>1</sup> Translated from Pascal 1669: II, No. 72, pp. 92 f.

<sup>2</sup> Seifert 1973: pp. 201–208.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.: p. 203 and p. 238, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> See Essay IV: sect. 3.19 of Hoche 2008.

<sup>5</sup> '[...] d'insurmontables difficultés [...] proviennent de ce que je tente d'unir ma conscience non à *mon* corps mais au corps *des autres*. En effet, le corps dont je viens d'esquisser la description n'est pas *mon* corps tel qu'il est *pour moi*. Je n'ai jamais vu ni ne verrai mon cerveau, ni mes glandes endocrines' ['Insurmountable difficulties arise from fact that I try to unite my consciousness not with my body but with the body of others. In effect, the body the description of which I just sketched is not *my* body such as it is *for myself*. I have never seen, and I will never see, my brain or my endocrine glands']: Sartre 1943: p. 365; cf. 367: '[...] l'origine de ce faux problème: c'est que l'on a voulu lier *ma* conscience des objets au corps de *l'autre*' ['this spurious problem originates from trying to join *my* consciousness of objects to *another person's* body']. (Sartre's italics.)

<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that the 'independence of consciousness' rightly ascribed to material things in the world is a highly ambiguous matter. Up to now, this ambiguity tends to be neglected; see Hoche & Strube 1985: pp. 27 f.

ontologique'),<sup>7</sup> fundamentally distances himself from Husserl, whose intentionality, in his opinion, is but the 'caricature' of the true transcendence looked for.<sup>8</sup>

## 2. Two genuine body-consciousness-world problems

Much less spectacular than the two pseudo-problems just outlined are a number of genuine and respectable problems which likewise concern the relations between body, consciousness, and the world. The reader may already gather that what I have in mind is the widely ramified complex of body-consciousness-world problems as conceived solely from the *third-person perspective* on the one hand and the similarly ramified complex of body-consciousness-world problems as conceived solely from the *first-person perspective* on the other. The former is the domain of psychologists, physiologists, and a number of other scientists, on which, however, the 'neurophilosophers' of our days use to poach, too.<sup>9</sup> The latter is one of the three natural domains of philosophy<sup>10</sup> and has mostly been dealt with by phenomenologists, especially in the fields of transcendental phenomenology and existential ontology.

**2.1.** As *perceived* from the *third-person* perspective, the relations obtaining between body, consciousness, and the world need not be attended too much by the *philosopher at work*, that is to say, by the philosopher during his 'office-hours' – or so I, for one, believe. Intricate and time-consuming though the empirical inquiries into the manifold facets of these relations doubtless are – I am sure there will remain, and still newly arise, a lot of fascinating research-projects for many centuries to come –, their most basic features can, I think, be quite simply sketched. There is a human subject amidst the material world, of which he, being (from the third-person point of view) himself a material object among others, is part, and other material objects exert multifarious causal influences on his body. For instance, light rays of different wave-lengths, reflected in this or that way by visible things, stimulate his retinae; the resulting electrochemical impulses are conveyed, by afferent neurons, toward his central nervous system; in his brain, countless interactions with contributions (say, 'engrams') of other parts of his nervous system (and his biological body at large) take place; and the resulting nervous impulses are conveyed, by efferent neurons, to effectors such as muscles which become active and produce, say, speech, gestures, or bodily movements which exert immediate causal influences on material objects (including other human beings) in the world surrounding him.

**2.2.** As *experienced* from the *first-person* perspective, however, the relations between *my* body, *my* consciousness, and *my* world define a field of philosophical – not only, but for the most part: phenomenological – research which certainly is no less complicated than the scientific field of research just outlined. From the very beginnings of phenomenology in Husserl and, arguably, Brentano, the relation of consciousness to the objects we encounter in the world has been a central

---

<sup>7</sup> Sartre 1943: pp. 27–29.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.: pp. 145, 152 f. – Opposing this verdict, I do think that Husserl lucidly pleaded for something which might perhaps be called a 'transcendence within the immanence'; in an especially succinct and felicitous way he did so in Husserl 1907: esp. Lectures II and III. (The *term* occurs in Husserl 1913, tr. 1931: § 57, where it has a different meaning, though.)

<sup>9</sup> It remains to be seen how the contributions of the latter, as opposed to the contributions of scientists proper, will eventually be judged by the scientific community.

<sup>10</sup> See Introduction: sect. 10, of Hoche 2008.

topic. In modern psychology and philosophy, Franz Brentano was the first to revive the medieval technical term 'intentio' and to speak of an 'intentional object', and Husserl is certainly the one who did most to clarify this tricky and controversial concept.<sup>11</sup> From the point of view of a pure noematics, the question of how consciousness can intelligibly 'reach' its intentional objects has been dealt with in Hoche 2008: Essay IV, section 3.11.

What is perhaps less well-known in the circles of more analytically or scientifically minded consciousness theorists is the fact that the relation between my consciousness and my body *as I myself am aware of them* has likewise been made the topic of extended phenomenological research. This has notably been the case in French phenomenology, which, however, seems to me to have left the sober Husserlian spirit far behind, and with the recent developments of which I am not conversant; but this can also be illuminatingly done within the framework of a pure noematics. For it can be shown in detail that even in my completely unrestricted imagination I cannot possibly conceive of my subjective conscious experiences in separation from my experienced or 'functioning' body, that is, my body as it is accessed by myself, or from my first-person standpoint. By appropriately applying the method of free phenomenological variation,<sup>12</sup> we can convince ourselves that, if only we consistently stick to the first-person point of view, the close connection or unity of consciousness and body – far from being an *impossibility* (and yet a fact, which hence seems to be only explainable by recourse to God's omnipotence)<sup>13</sup> – on the contrary is a *necessity* in that its negation or contradictory, the mutual separation of consciousness and body, is strictly inconceivable and in this sense impossible.<sup>14</sup> So here we have, I think, an important 'paradigm-case' confirming Aristotle's conviction, illustrated by means of examples mostly taken from mathematics and physics, that philosophy and science begin with our being amazed that things are as in fact they are and that, if we finally succeed in coping with the issue at hand, this amazement gives way to our seeing that, on the contrary ('enantion'), things cannot be otherwise – in short: that our *amazement about a fact seemingly impossible* can be transformed into the *insight into a necessity*.<sup>15</sup>

That my consciousness is permeated with bodily (corporeal, somatic) features may be most easily seen from the fact that I cannot possibly perceive, or even conceive of, a material object which does not appear to me in a certain direction, distance, and perspective, so that we may say that my body is present in each and every sensual perception in the function of being the centre or zero point of my noematic world perspectively arranged around myself – as my 'geometrical eye', as Wittgenstein once or twice illuminatingly put it. Furthermore, an object perceived or imagined by

<sup>11</sup> Later on, this concept has been adopted by G. E. M. Anscombe and other linguistic philosophers; see Essay IV: 2.3.1, of Hoche 2008. Arguably in a closely related sense Max Weber 1913: sect. III, p. 439, introduced the concept of a 'subjective referent' ['subjektiver Bezogenheitsgegenstand'] into his 'Verstehende Soziologie'; cf. *ibid.*: pp. 427–440 and Weber 1921: pp. 541–570.

<sup>12</sup> See Introduction: sect. 11, of Hoche 2008.

<sup>13</sup> See sect. 1.1, above.

<sup>14</sup> In Hoche 1990: ch. 9 ('Möglichkeit und Vorstellbarkeit [Possibility and conceivability]') and ch. 10 ('Vorstellbarkeit und Unvorstellbarkeit [Conceivability and inconceivability]'), *inter alia* I tried to deal with familiar qualms concerning the relation between (in)conceivability and (im)possibility, which I think are based on insufficient distinctions. (As Moore 1903: p. VII, concisely put it: 'the work of analysis and distinction is often very difficult'. In Hoche & Strube 1985: A.I, I dedicated a whole chapter to appreciating the great importance of this statement.)

<sup>15</sup> Aristotle: *Metaphysics*, Book I, 982b11–983a21.; cf. Hoche 1983.

me is always perceived or imagined in a given sensory quality, to wit, as being seen and/or heard and the like, and by changing my position, looking in a different direction, closing my eyes, stopping my ears, etc., I can easily modify the details and even the sensory quality of what I am perceiving. As far as the voluntary actions (or, frequently, reflex actions) just mentioned are concerned, although they often go unnoticed, I can in principle become aware of them through my kinaesthetic or motion sense.<sup>16</sup>

Let me add, however, that the role of kinaesthesia in the awareness of my own actions has, I think, often been overestimated; what in my view is much more relevant are the 'gerundive' traits the objects of my personal noematic world present to me.<sup>17</sup> Not surprisingly, these practical features, too, reveal the bodily structure of my consciousness; for whenever a noematic object of mine appears – and appeals – to me as being, say, an apple *to be plucked by myself right now*, this gerundive feature refers to my arms and hands presently being able to reach and grasp it, or my hands and legs enabling me to climb the tree or fetch a ladder, etc. But let me deepen the issue of human action as being an important form of consciousness in the following section.

### 3. Human action in the third- and the first-person perspectives

I think we may safely say that to our *fellow-men* we ascribe a certain action – as well as a certain perception, emotion, body feeling, etc. – on the basis of our seeing, hearing, or otherwise perceiving how they nonverbally and/or verbally behave ('act' and 'react') in a given situation. This may seem to be simple and uncontroversial indeed. But the difficulties begin as soon as we take a closer look and try to work out a detailed description of what precisely we are doing in such a case; and the difficulties become even greater once we pose the '*what is*'-question, namely: 'What is (are), from my point of view, somebody else's action(s)?'. Again, as always in philosophy, we must proceed exemplarily and piecemeal; for I think that Ryle's dictum 'In philosophy, generalizations are unclarifications.'<sup>18</sup> can hardly be taken seriously enough.

**3.1.** Therefore let us first ask how to describe what precisely we are doing when we say in a given speech-act situation that someone else (say, Jane) is making a coat. Normally in this case we are performing an illocutionary act of assertion, which is governed by rules of which only what Searle called the 'preparatory rule' seems to me to be of interest in the present context. According to Searle's suggestion, which I will adopt for the purpose at hand, the preparatory rule for speech acts of asserting is this: '[The speaker] *S* has evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of [the asserted proposition] *p*.' What exactly is my evidence for the truth of the proposition 'Jane is making a coat.'? It is my perception of Jane's relevant behaviour or, what in my eyes amounts to the same thing, Jane's relevant behaviour *as, qua, or in its capacity of* being perceived by myself.<sup>19</sup>

But what pieces or stretches of Jane's behaviour are *relevant* in this case? I think we may reply: All and only those stretches of her verbal and/or nonverbal behaviour I have learned, from infancy, to connect with what all or most of us use to call the making of a coat. It would be extremely difficult to describe such pieces of behaviour without using the verbal phrase 'to make a coat', and certainly

<sup>16</sup> That we are aware, not only of objects out in the world, but also of our own body (physical sensations, pains, sexual desire, and so on) is important but a different story which, I think, does not immediately contribute to the 'bodily structure' of many of my conscious experiences.

<sup>17</sup> See Essay IV: sects. 3.6.7, 3.9.1, and 3.15.5 of Hoche 2008, and section 3.3, below.

<sup>18</sup> Ryle 1951: 255.

<sup>19</sup> See Essay IV: sect. 3.6.5 of Hoche 2008.

this is not the place to try to go into further details. Therefore I suggest to speak in this case simply of a 'coat-making behaviour' – just as in the great majority of other such cases we could only speak, say, of a 'reading-a-book behaviour', a 'stealing-a-book-from-the-library behaviour', a 'writing-a-letter-to-Jane behaviour', a 'being-pleased-by-the-flattery behaviour', a 'having-fallen-in-love behaviour', a 'having-headache behaviour', and so forth. All these types of behaviour can adopt a legion of divergent features which I think it is virtually impossible to specify.

What is important, however, is the *consistency* of the relevant behaviour. For we would be at a loss if, say, stretches of someone else's 'reading behaviour' would alternate with stretches of 'not-reading behaviour' or 'only-pretending-to-read behaviour'. In some such cases we would downright say that our fellow-man is just pretending to read, in some others that he only seems to be reading, and in still others we would be unable to say what precisely he might possibly be doing in the presence of the opened book before his eyes. To have a short term for what I have in mind, and what the reader should not find difficult to understand at least in principle, I should like to speak of a *consistent* behaviour of the sort in question, or of a *consistent relevant behaviour*.

On this basis I think we may say that my *criterion* for asserting that Jane is making a coat is my perceiving a behaviour of Jane's which I judge to be a consistent coat making behaviour. More generally speaking: The *criterion* on the basis of which I ascribe to somebody else an action of type *a* is my perception of a consistent relevant behaviour, that is, of a consistent *a*-behaviour of theirs.<sup>20</sup>

Let us now try to answer the tricky question, posed at the beginning of the present section 3: 'What is (are), from my point of view, somebody else's action(s)?' I touched already on the problem of how to properly understand and deal with 'what is'-questions in general.<sup>21</sup> In particular I discussed the question of whether or not to consider conscious events of my fellow-men – and possibly also of higher non-human animals – to be nothing but their relevant perceivable (observable) behaviour, nonverbal and/or verbal, in specified situations. Though I warned against making light of Dudda's suggestion to treat conscious events of others as mere theoretical constructs, I decided, if subject to further research, in favour of a 'semi-behaviouristic nothing-buttery'.<sup>22</sup> This decision of mine can only gain in plausibility if we think of *actions*, which I suggested not to contrast with but to count among conscious experiences.<sup>23</sup>

For it would be strange indeed to regard the actions of others not as empirical observables but as theoretical constructs. Furthermore, my suggestion to *definitionally identify* the actions of others with certain stretches of their overt behaviour in a way accords with, or at least seems to come rather close to, the position of some renowned contemporary philosophers for whom a human action, irrespective of whether it is accessed from the third-person or the first-person perspective, is a composite entity consisting of 'an intention in action plus a bodily movement [...]'.<sup>24</sup> I would definitely prefer, of course, to say instead that a human action (performed at time *t*) *as seen from the point of view of somebody else* is a bodily movement *which either takes place or fails to take place (at time t)* – for an overt behaviour need not be a *movement*, or a *set of movements* – plus

<sup>20</sup> This seems to me to be in accordance with the normal use of the term 'criterion'; see, for instance, Malcolm 1959: pp. 24, 44, 56, 60; Birnbacher 1974: esp. sect. 3.3.3; Hoche & Strube 1985: pp. 193 f.; and sect. 3.2 with fn. 26, below.

<sup>21</sup> Esp. in Essay IV: sect. 3.8.5 of Hoche 2008.

<sup>22</sup> See Essay IV: sect. 3.15, esp. subsect. 3.15.4, of Hoche 2008.

<sup>23</sup> See Essay IV: sect. 2.3.2 of Hoche 2008.

<sup>24</sup> Searle 1983: p. 106; cf. esp. pp. 101, 107 f., 125.

an intention in action. And I would add that an intention in action, *as seen from the point of view of somebody else*, is nothing but the totality of the agent's relevant observable behaviour *before, during, and after* his carrying out, or failing to carry out, the movement at time *t*. For *with what intention* somebody else is doing whatever he is doing at time *t* I can only gather from what he has said and done *before t*, is saying and doing *at t*, and will say and do *after t* – provided, of course, that his sayings and doings are relevant to the action in question. In short: For myself, the action of somebody else – just as any other piece of consciousness of others – is nothing but their relevant overt behaviour in a given situational environment ('behaviour-in-situation').<sup>25</sup>

**3.2.** The criterion on the basis of which I ascribe to *somebody else* an action of type *a* is, to repeat, my perception of a consistent relevant behaviour, that is, of a consistent *a*-behaviour, of his or hers. It seems to me to be obvious, however, that to *myself* I ascribe a certain action not on the basis of such a behavioural criterion, and in fact not on some criterial basis in the first place. For a *criterion* is usually considered to be an *evidentiary* or *verificational criterion*,<sup>26</sup> and in the case of my own actions I can speak neither of *evidence* nor of *verification* (as long as we abide by the normal juridical, scientific, and philosophical uses of these technical terms).<sup>27</sup> So each of us should seriously doubt whether he is well advised if he considers his own actions, insofar as they are accessed from his own first-person point of view, to be something like his relevant overt behaviour in a given situation, or some form of behaviour at all.

If so, how else should we characterise our own actions as accessed from the first-person point of view of each of us? In Hoche 2008: Essay IV, I suggested to consider a given conscious experience (say, an action) of mine, insofar as it is accessible from my own first-person perspective, to be *nothing but* one of my personal – simple or complex – objects of reference ('intentional objects') *as, qua, or in its capacity of*, being given to me in one of its constantly varying subjective modes of appearance, that is, as a 'noematic phenomenon' in very much the Husserlian sense.<sup>28</sup> By any such noematic phenomenon I am confronted with a vast array of subjective features, and according to the given type of conscious experience these features may be only *theoretical* ('indicative') ones, or *theoretical* as well as *emotional* ones, or, in the case of actions, *theoretical* and *emotional* and also *practical* ('imperative' or 'gerundive') ones.

According to this *purely noematic conception of consciousness*, from my own point of view my own action of, say, catching the tram should be taken to be nothing but *the tram to be caught by me*,<sup>29</sup> and similarly my action of making a coat would be nothing but *a coat to be made by me*. I have borrowed the latter example from Aristotle, who may perhaps be taken to have been the first to

<sup>25</sup> It might be suspected that this definition is circular in that the term 'relevant' which it contains would have to be spelled out as 'relevant to the (type of) action, or whatever conscious event, in question'. This is not correct, however; for in the second paragraph of the present subsection 3.1, I introduced the expression 'relevant behaviour' as an abbreviation for 'behaviour I have learned, from infancy, to connect with what all or most of us use to *call* an action, or whatever conscious event, of the type in question' – for instance, 'making a coat', 'reading a book', or 'having headache'.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. sect. 3.1 with fn. 20, above.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Moore 1954–1955: p. 266; Strawson 1959: pp. 99–112 (esp. 108), 134; Austin 1962: pp. 115–117, 140–142.

<sup>28</sup> See esp. Essay IV: sects. 3.5–3.10 of Hoche 2008. For the special case of actions, see *ibid.*: sects. 3.6.7 and 3.9.1, and the much more detailed considerations in Hoche 1973: part II, *passim*.

<sup>29</sup> Cf. Sartre 1936–1937: p. 94; cf. pp. 97 f. For a discussion, see Hoche 1973: § 16.

envisage a gerundive and for that matter sort of a noematic conception of action. For Aristotle, the conclusion ('*tò sympérasma*') of a practical syllogism is an action ('*prâxis*'), and such an action he once characterises as being, say, the coat to be made or produced ('*tò himátion poietéon*'): '*kaì tò sympérasma, tò himátion poietéon, prâxis estin*'<sup>30</sup> – 'the conclusion, the coat to be made, is an action'.

**3.3.** So, whereas I take a *fellow man's* action to be a nonverbal and/or verbal 'behaviour-in-situation' of his or hers and hence a specific event in nature, I take an action of *mine* to be essentially a system of gerundive characters of my subjective noematic phenomena; and I took pains to show that such phenomena are *not* part of nature.<sup>31</sup> So, as in the case of conscious experiences other than actions, on pain of utter confusion we must carefully see to it that we do not mix up, or blend into each other, these two complementary perspectives on human action. I think this is already done if we say, using Searle's words, that a human action is a 'composite entity' which consists of 'an intention in action plus a bodily movement [...]'.<sup>32</sup> I have no objections indeed against saying that in human actions – actions of others as well as actions of my own – it may be highly useful to distinguish between the action proper and the intention with which it is being carried out; but in both perspectives action proper and intention in action belong to the field of *one and the same* perspective, as can be outlined in the following way.

An action of mine, insofar as I have access to it from my own first-person perspective, is a system of gerundive features of my noematic phenomena. Normally, such features appeal to me only in the light of my beliefs as well as my personal motives, notably my intentions or 'forward-looking motives'.<sup>33</sup> Only on condition I intend to do something specific (say, to make a coat), certain objects in my surroundings (say, a piece of woollen cloth, a pair of scissors, or a sewing-machine) adopt specific gerundive features (say, the features of being something *to be purchased by me, to be looked for by me, or to be handled by me*) – provided, of course, I believe these objects to be suitable for the purpose at hand. Or, to take some other examples: Unless I were hungry or

<sup>30</sup> *De motu animalium* 701a20. Cf. Hoche 1973: p. 172 with fn. 165. It should be noted that, for my noematic interpretation of my own actions, nothing depends on whether or nor I properly interpret Aristotle's doctrine of the practical syllogism, which since many centuries and up to our time has been discussed highly controversially.

<sup>31</sup> See Essay IV: sect. 3.11 of Hoche 2008.

<sup>32</sup> See sect. 3.1 with fn. 24, above, where I tried to disentangle the confusion likely to arise from Searle's lapidary statement. – The revealing term 'composite entity' is being used in Searle 1983: Subject Index, entry 'action'. Similarly, Searle (ibid.: p. 101) speaks of 'the complex event which constitutes the action'. See also ibid.: p. 106, where he says that 'the whole action is an intention in action plus a bodily movement which is *caused* by the intention in action' (my italics). Under both perspectives on action, speaking of *causation* seems to me to be at best misleading.

<sup>33</sup> See Anscombe 1957: §§ 12–14. I take it that, from my own point of view, these motives of mine can and should *themselves* be interpreted as being higher-order gerundive features of my noematic phenomena (or smaller or greater sets of them). This issue certainly has to do with the traditional distinctions between what I intend to do for the sake of some other purpose and what I intend to do for its own sake ('*entelécheia*'), and between what is good in respect to some other good and good in itself. But this is not the place for a discussion of these problems. – The co-operation of *intentions* and *beliefs* in the practice of acting is not a central topic in Anscombe's booklet; but it has often been noticed by others, e.g., MacIntyre 1969: pp. 50–52; Stegmüller 1969: pp. 404, 409 f. Even *theoretically* intention and belief cannot be treated in separation from each other; see Hoche 2004.



planned to provide for the next winter by making jelly, etc., and unless I took them to be edible, my property, etc., the apples on the tree wouldn't take on the gerundive character of being fruit *to be plucked by me*; only if I am going to take the bus, this vehicle assumes the gerundive trait of being a means of transportation *to be reached by me in time* (provided I believe it is the right line); and only in the light of my proposing to call somebody up on the spot (and my belief that the person in question lives in my town), the local telephone directory can present to me the gerundive feature of being a book *to be paged through by me right away*.<sup>34</sup> Certainly it would be an untenable prejudice to believe that the intentions of mine need to precede my actions in time.<sup>35</sup> But they are at work from the very beginning, and I cannot even start performing a determinate action unless I am aware of my intention. – In the case of actions of others, however, I can gather the intention with which they are being done only from the overt behaviour before, during, and after the action in question; and again, I think, there is reason to definitionally identify their intentions with their relevant behaviour-in-situation.<sup>36</sup>

**3.4.** Let me add in passing that, once we take the separation and incompatibility of the two complementary perspectives seriously, there is no reasonable justification whatsoever for transferring to my own actions, as I have access to them myself, the determinism to which, again from my point of view, the actions of others, just as the rest of at least the macrophysical and 'mesophysical' occurrences in the physical world, may be rightly taken to be subjected. So I think we have to conclude that my own actions for myself, in contradistinction to actions of others for myself and arguably to my actions for others, are not subjected to natural causation. So my own actions as accessed from my own first-person perspective seem to me to be distinguished by precisely that 'independence of empirical conditions' which, according to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (A 553), is nothing but 'freedom' in a 'negative' sense. In this sense we may also speak of a complementarity of freedom and necessity, or determinism, in human action.<sup>37</sup>

#### 4. A plea for the coexistence of the two complementary perspectives

Throughout this essay and Hoche 2008: Essays IV and V, I have been trying to disclose the fundamental difference between the first- and the third-person perspectives, and to defend the view that an entity given in the one of them can be neither identical with nor numerically different

---

<sup>34</sup> In the last example, I deliberately added the words 'on the spot' and 'right away'. For although in the case of my present actions an addition of this kind is always to be silently understood, there are also certain action-related noematic features which should be distinguished from gerundive features proper and which therefore I suggest to identify, not with my actual actions as experienced by myself, but, for instance, with so far only potential actions which appeal to me in varying degrees so that I more or less seriously consider them for realisation in the nearer or farther future. These are fine-grained distinctions which, furthermore, are rendered still more difficult to survey by the tricky problem of how to distinguish between several phases of an action and how to determine the boundaries of what may be called my 'present' action. All of these questions I have circumstantially dealt with in Hoche 1973: esp. §§ 32 and 35.

<sup>35</sup> See *ibid.*: §§ 29–31.

<sup>36</sup> See sect. 3.1 (last paragraph), above.

<sup>37</sup> See Hoche 1994. – It should be noted that freedom in this 'negative' sense is not the kind of freedom, however it is to be defined in detail, that is of interest in everyday life, especially to lawyers, judges, jurors, educators, and so on. The latter concept of freedom is applicable not just to my own actions as I experience them from my first-person perspective but likewise to the actions of others as I come to know them in my third-person perspective. Therefore, this is not the place to discuss it.

from an entity given in the other. Rather, they stand to each other in the relation of what I call a 'categorical' difference. Hence we cannot properly say that 'the *two* entities' are categorially different from each other; and, strictly speaking, even referring to an entity given in the one perspective and an entity given in the other perspective by means of the plural form 'they' – as I inadvertently though, I hope, pardonably just did (and which, without breakneck verbal acrobatics, we can in fact hardly avoid) – ought to give us linguistic qualms. So it is not surprising that this important kind of difference, which, I think, has to be accepted alongside the familiar relation of numerical difference, has been notoriously neglected in philosophy and science. And yet in this case – as in a lot of others which notably Frege and Wittgenstein called our attention to – we cannot avoid struggling with the pitfalls and snares of language if we want to escape confusion and reach philosophically satisfying results.

**4.1.** Suppose we shun this struggle against ingrained linguistic habits (the 'engrams' of our ordinary language use since early childhood, as it were) and regard the distinction between numerical identity and numerical diversity as an exhausting dichotomy, and suppose, furthermore, that we take it for granted that human conscious experiences – say, the perception of an approaching car and the ensuing action of jumping out of its way – are sort of 'things in themselves' which exist autonomously, that is to say, which 'are there' independently of someone having cognitive access to them.<sup>38</sup> In this case, I think, we are inevitably misled into believing that the first- and the third-person perspectives must needs contradict each other, and that one of them is specious and has to give way to the other. Most of the many present-day believers in such a contradiction share with each other the conviction that the third-person approach to human consciousness – that is, the approach to the consciousness of others or to one's own consciousness as if it were the consciousness of somebody else<sup>39</sup> – is the 'scientifically correct' one. As far as I can see, an explicit reasoning to this effect can be rarely (if ever) found; but it seems to me that this conviction is silently based on some such considerations as the following one. My own consciousness is, at it were, outnumbered by the innumerable 'consciousnesses' of my fellow-men and many higher non-human animals, and it is not at all problematic to communicate with others

---

<sup>38</sup> Cf. Introduction: sect. 7, of Hoche 2008.

<sup>39</sup> I cannot see my presently seeing something, say, a tree. To start with, I cannot see my eyes converging toward the tree I see. Even a mirror or monitor cunningly installed in the tree would be of no help; for what I would see in such cases would be my eyes converging, not toward the tree, but toward an image of themselves. (What I can see, with or without the help of looking glasses and so on, is, of course, my passive corporeal body, or part of it. But this is a different story; for here we are concerned with my perceptions, actions, and other conscious experiences of my own.) However, I am *immediately and unquestionably aware* of my presently seeing the tree, and so much so that it would be pointless to say that I *seem* to see, or that I *know* that I now see, the tree. Similarly, I cannot doubt, cannot meaningfully say that I 'know', need not 'find out', etc., that I saw the tree *a more or less short time ago*. (For a necessary case distinction and a more thoroughgoing discussion, see Essay IV: sects. 3.12–3.13 of Hoche 2008.) But suppose we are looking at photographs or motion pictures taken *a long time ago*. Then it is quite common indeed to say such things as 'I seem to see the girl looking out that window [to wit, then and there].', or 'It seems that I am making a coat [to wit, then and there].' And in such a situation I might quite naturally also be asked: 'How do you know that you are seeing the girl looking out that window [to wit, then and there]?' or 'How do you know that you are making a coat [to wit, then and there]?' This phenomenon makes it plain that in such cases I take a third-person view on my own (past) perceptions, actions, etc., as if they were the perceptions, actions, etc., of somebody else; cf. Essay IV: sect. 3.19 with fn. 161 of Hoche 2008.

about the sensations, perceptions, convictions, emotions, intentions, actions, etc., of arbitrarily many third persons – whereas I am principally unable to share with anybody else my own cognitive approach to my own sensations, perceptions, convictions, intentions, and actions, and could not even speak about them in a public language (which is the only language we have) unless I had access to the consciousness of others, too. So the primacy of the third-person view on consciousness seems to be secured.

**4.2.** But let me call your attention to the following two facts. First, our most familiar everyday-life experience as well as an abundant literature in philosophical, psychological, and other fields of knowledge has taught us that I can likewise communicate with a fellow-man about *his* and *my own* conscious experiences and their phenomenal properties in a way that enables us to perfectly rationally assent to, doubt, or contradict our mutual statements or considerations. (At least I do hope that the reader will find what I said so far either contravening his or her own experience or, preferably, at least basically acceptable and worth further consideration, but not literally nonsensical, that is, void of intelligible meaning!) Second, the very basis for raising the question of primacy in the first place is unsound. For the only collision which at first sight might perhaps seem possible could occur between *my* experiencing *my* perceptions, emotions, intentions, actions, and so on, and *somebody else's* perceiving *my* perceptions, emotions, intentions, actions, and so on – but as I am not, and cannot possibly be, somebody else as well as myself, this supposed 'collision' does in fact, and of necessity, not occur. So there is no collision and hence no contradiction between what is viewed from the first- and from the third-person perspectives. In other words: The first-person and the third-person approaches to a 'target consciousness' are not open to one and the same person (or 'source consciousness'). I can (and must) choose the first-person attitude with respect to myself and to nothing else, and I can choose the third-person attitude only with respect to anything else, that is, to the objective world including my fellow-men, higher animals, and their conscious experiences; and it seems reasonable to generalise and say<sup>40</sup> that anyone else can take the first-person view only on himself and the third-person view only on me and the rest of the world. From this it follows that to each of us his or her own subjective and yet bodily structured<sup>41</sup> consciousness is accessible in *one* specific way and the objective world, including the 'objectified' consciousness we ascribe to others, in *quite another* specific way. Neither one's own consciousness nor someone else's consciousness can be given to anyone of us in *either this or that* way to be freely chosen, and so a conflict cannot come up. For any two persons  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  it holds true that  $P_1$ 's view on  $P_1$ 's consciousness or on  $P_2$ 's consciousness cannot be combined with  $P_2$ 's view on  $P_2$ 's consciousness or on  $P_1$ 's consciousness so as to yield a common, unified, or integrated view, and hence there exists no way in which  $P_1$ 's consciousness or  $P_2$ 's consciousness can be accessible to  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  alike. For this reason, the correlates of the two views on human consciousness can never coexist,<sup>42</sup> or exist side by side, as being two numerically different ones; for as soon as we catch sight of the *one* of them we lose sight of the *other* – and, to repeat, I take it that they do not exist autonomously as sort of Kantian 'things-in-themselves'. Rather, a correlate of the first-person view

---

<sup>40</sup> See Essay IV: sect. 3.19 of the present collection [i.e., Hoche 2008].

<sup>41</sup> See sect. 2.2, above.

<sup>42</sup> It should be noted that what in a way coexists, or should coexist, are the two – *numerically* different – approaches to, or perspectives on, consciousness, but not the – *categorially* different – correlates of each of these views.

and a correlate of the third-person view are<sup>43</sup> *categorially* different from each other and in this sense '*complementary*' data, which, being unable to be either one and the same or two different entities, cannot causally interact, either.

### 5. Phenomena of alleged psychophysical interaction

The last remark cannot fail to provoke the question of how to deal with the plethora of everyday as well as medical, for instance, psychosomatic phenomena apparently exemplifying psychophysical and physiopsychical causation. It would be preposterous, of course, to try to explain these phenomena away. But I think it would be no less preposterous to offhand regard them as our principal witnesses against the conception of psychophysical complementarity in particular and anthropological complementarity at large. Instead of rashly throwing in the towel, we should rather regard this tricky problem as a challenge to try and launch a novel conceptual analysis of what seems to be psychophysical 'interaction'. As I tried to make plain, there are two complementary and incompatible body-consciousness-world complexes;<sup>44</sup> and elsewhere I went into a couple of pertinent details at some more length.<sup>45</sup> So I am confident that a solution to this purely conceptual (and hence non-empirical) problem which will turn out to be more satisfying than the traditional and time-honoured one may be found in the long run – not, I daresay, in the near future, and certainly not in the rest of the present essay. I even think it possible that, in this case, too – as in the closely related case of a 'connection' or 'unity' of consciousness and body –, some day we will find ourselves in a position to transform *amazement about a fact seemingly impossible* into an *insight into a necessity*.<sup>46</sup> But this is a dream of the future, and at present I cannot do more than roughly sketch a few thoughts I take to be helpful.

**5.1.** If we say, as in fact we often do, that perceiving a dog consists in the effect of physical stimuli on our nervous system which, 'somewhere in the brain' and in a way 'we do not yet understand', are 'processed' or changed into psychical events, then we seem to have adduced one of the most common examples for a *physiopsychical* causation. And if we say, for instance, that my seeing the dog, my feeling scared by it, and my trying to evade it make me act (to wit, overtly behave) in such-and-such a way, say, run away or climb a tree, then we seem to have given one of the most common examples for a *psychophysical* causation. But if we remember what I have said so far, then we cannot fail to see that describing perceptions and actions *like this* is nothing but the result of illegitimately blending the first- and the third-person perspectives. As elsewhere I tried to make plain,<sup>47</sup> the descriptions given in each of these perspectives are self-contained in that they offer neither 'enclaves' to accommodate first-person data in a third-person view, or vice versa, nor 'adapters' for bringing the two views together. In the case of actions, moreover, I suggested to say that, from *my* point of view, intentions and other motives of *others* are but stretches of their overt behaviour, and that, again from my own point of view, what 'causes' my own acting are not events and other objects *themselves* but events and other objects *qua being subjectively given to me in a certain way* (noematic phenomena).<sup>48</sup> For instance, I am trying to evade the dog, not because it is

<sup>43</sup> Cf. the linguistic remarks in the first paragraph of the present section 4.

<sup>44</sup> See sect. 2, above.

<sup>45</sup> Essay V: sects. 2.3–2.7 of Hoche 2008.

<sup>46</sup> See sect. 2.2 with fn. 15, above.

<sup>47</sup> See Essay IV: sect. 3.15.5, and Essay V: sect. 2.2.6 of Hoche 2008.

<sup>48</sup> See Essay IV: sects. 3.9.1, 3.10–3.11, 3.14–3.15 of Hoche 2008, and sects. 3.2–3.3, above.

on the verge of attacking me, but because *I believe (rightly or not), or have the impression*, that it is so; and this 'motivational causation' must be carefully distinguished from 'natural (or physical) causation'.

**5.2.** Now one might try to interpret other cases of alleged 'psychophysical interaction' on precisely this model. 'The most well accepted evidence for the effect of states of mind on medical outcome is undoubtedly the "placebo effect".', says Velmans.<sup>49</sup> On the basis of his 'dual-aspect' theory, he has, of course, no serious problems to find a plausible explanation for this effect. But as I endeavour to avoid this low-price competitor of what I take to be complementarity properly understood, I have to search for another solution.

However, let us first have a brief look at what medical scientists have to say about the placebo effect. The London physiologist Patrick D. Wall emphasises the fact that in the case of 'jaw tightness (trismus) and swelling after the extraction of wisdom teeth [...] the placebo therapy not only reduced the pain report [sic!] but also improved the ability to open the mouth and reduced the swelling'<sup>50</sup> and concludes that the placebo effect 'is evidently a common and powerful phenomenon which needs explanation'.<sup>51</sup> However, in a more recent meta-analysis the authors of the study come to a quite different conclusion.<sup>52</sup> As I had no opportunity yet to read this paper myself, I have to rely on the summary given in *Wikipedia*:<sup>53</sup>

[...] there was no significant placebo effect in studies in which objective outcomes (such as blood pressure) were measured by an independent observer. The placebo effect could only be documented in studies in which the outcomes (improvement or failure to improve) were reported by the subjects themselves. The authors concluded that the placebo effect does not have "powerful clinical effects" (*objective effects*) and that patient-reported improvements (*subjective effects*) in pain were small and could not be clearly distinguished from bias. *These results suggest that the placebo effect is largely subjective.* This would help explain why the placebo effect is easiest to demonstrate in conditions where subjective factors are very prominent or significant parts of the problem. Some of these conditions are headache, stomachache, asthma, allergy, tension, and the experience of pain [...].

**5.3.** I take it that '*subjective effects*' of a placebo treatment, if there should be any clear-cut cases of them (see section 5.2, above), could be easily shown to be compatible with my strictly complementaristic position. If I have swallowed a pill I erroneously believe to be a pharmacologically effective remedy against headaches, and if a little bit later my headache is in fact mitigated or disappears, then I can describe the process, thanks to the subjective access I have to my own conscious experiences, as an out-and-out first-person-perspective affair: My (*subjectively*) *believing or expecting* something is followed by my (*subjectively*) *sensing* a decrease of pain. But the process can also be described as an out-and-out third-person-perspective affair: I

<sup>49</sup> Velmans 2002: p. 5; for further examples, see pp. 4–7. See Essay V: sect. 2.5.3 of Hoche 2008.

<sup>50</sup> Wall 1996: p. 164; his source is Hashish, Finman, & Harvey 1988.

<sup>51</sup> Wall 1996: p. 171.

<sup>52</sup> Hróbjartsson & Gøtzsche 2001.

<sup>53</sup> *Wikipedia*, entry 'placebo' (November 29, 2007); the italics are partly mine. – I am well aware of the fact that *Wikipedia* is often taken to be unciteable in scientific and philosophical contexts; but I also remember having come across a comparative study which considerably relativises this prejudice, even in comparison with the renowned *Encyclopaedia Britannica*.

credibly report to an investigator that I took a certain pill (of which he knows that it is pharmacologically inert), that I believed it to be an effective remedy, and that my (feeling a) headache has in fact diminished or disappeared; and the investigator comes to know about all this on the basis of what he hears (and possibly sees), that is, on the basis of his intersubjectively reproducible perceptions and observations.<sup>54</sup>

**5.4.** So what deserves a deeper discussion are only '*objective effects*' of a placebo treatment. Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that there are any such effects (see again section 5.2, above), that is to say, cases in which my believing in the efficacy of some medication or other sort of treatment, say, an ultrasound therapy,<sup>55</sup> has an influence, not only on my subjective feeling, but on the objectively observable state of my physical body. In the third-person view, a case in question may, I think, be described as follows. A subject has been treated, under clinical or laboratory conditions, in a certain way known to specialists to be objectively ineffective, but the patient has been told by the investigator that this way of dealing with his disorders is effective, and the investigator can convince himself that the subject believes it; and after some time, a positive change of his bodily (physiological and possibly also anatomical) condition can in fact be observed. Again a research report can be based on intersubjectively reproducible perceptions and observations alone – just as it ought to be.

It is true that a purely first-person description is not possible in this case; for even if I have the opportunity to observe with my own eyes which changes have, or have not, taken place in my physical body, these observations are throughout third-person-perspective observations:<sup>56</sup> I am looking at my own body as if it were somebody else's. But what about a mixed first-and-third-person description in such a case? According to what I have claimed so far, such a blending of descriptions which are partly based on a first- person and partly on a third-person view should inevitably lead to utter confusion and hence are inadmissible. And yet here there appears to be, at least at first sight, no way of avoiding such a supposedly impossible description; for certainly it appears that (or: as if) the following facts obtain(ed): First, I have an immediate first-person experience of what I did and what I believe (in this respect I neither need nor can rely on my perceiving what others tell me); second, at the same time I have a sensorium-mediated third-person perception of what has happened to my physical body; and third, I cannot help stating a coincidence or 'conjunction' of the two disparate cognitions which in favourable cases – and these alone would justify our speaking of a full-blown placebo effect – is sufficiently 'regular' for producing a case of Humean causation.

**5.5.** Elsewhere, I took sides with precisely this interpretation of causation.<sup>57</sup> However, as can be seen from their *practice*, the majority of present day scientists appear to be not satisfied with this, as it were, minimal form of causation. Rather, they seem to regard natural or physical causation, not only as a Humean regular conjunction or coincidence, which certainly is a necessary ingredient of this relation, but additionally as sort of an energetic flux, which, of course, must be taken to be

---

<sup>54</sup> This kind of a third-person report is what is normally found in medical journals.

<sup>55</sup> See Wall 1996: p. 164.

<sup>56</sup> In fact, I take it that speaking of a first-person-perspective *observation* would be a contradiction in terms.

<sup>57</sup> Essay V: sect. 2.3.2 of Hoche 2008.

restricted by the laws of conservation of energy and matter.<sup>58</sup> It is true that Hume rightly stressed that we never see a 'power or force' or an 'efficacy or energy' operating in objects in general and in the clearance between cause and effect in particular.<sup>59</sup> But I think it is equally true that scientists, in their search for causal relations, rarely if ever content themselves with a mere regular coincidence of events which diverge from each other to such a degree that a reasonably 'intelligible connection' between them is nowhere to be seen. Rather, whenever they are confronted with a pair of strikingly disparate events which nonetheless seem to stand to each other in a Humean relation of cause and effect, they are intent on filling in the gap between them with as many intermediate steps as possible; and this is doubtless one of the most effective stimulants for engaging in further research. But such intermediate steps (or 'missing links', as it were) can be hardly found in the case of a subjective belief of mine on the one hand and a physiological and/or anatomical change of my biological body on the other.<sup>60</sup>

If we are determined to abide by a flawless Humean view on causation, *this way out is*, of course, blocked. Nonetheless, *another one* remains wide open even under these aggravated conditions. For Hume doubtless thought of *two* – that is, *two numerically different* – events that stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect; and although beliefs and other 'propositional attitudes' are not conscious experiences in the strict sense,<sup>61</sup> my belief in the efficacy of a placebo on the one hand and physiological or even anatomical changes occurring within my biological body on the other are surely *categorially different* in that they lack a common sortal genus. So, after all, they can play the role of cause and effect not even under the auspices of an orthodox and devout Humean point of view.

**5.6.** Having reached this point, however, we ought to be alive to the fact that a stout defender of mental causation would be strongly inclined to react by thinking: 'So much the worse for the conception of a categorial difference between physical and mental events!'. In other words: We have reached a situation of the type which has sometimes been called 'Moore's see-saw'. For Moore was notoriously indecisive ('see-saw') as to which of two possible conclusions to draw in a given case; therefore, he repeatedly stressed<sup>62</sup> that if 'p' and 'q' are likewise appealing though mutually incompatible propositions, so that we have ' $\neg (p \ \& \ q)$ ', which is logically equivalent to both ' $p \rightarrow \neg q$ ' and ' $q \rightarrow \neg p$ ', then we have to decide whether to conclude that ' $\neg q$ ' (since we take 'p' to be 'more certain') or rather to conclude that ' $\neg p$ ' (since we take 'q' to be 'more certain'). Obviously, our present case is a striking example. Let 'p' be the proposition 'First- and third-person data stand to "each other"<sup>63</sup> in the relation of a categorial difference.', and let 'q' be the proposition

<sup>58</sup> If we adopt this view, the following apologetic considerations can be dispensed with.

<sup>59</sup> '[...] in all these expressions, *so apply'd*, we have really no distinct meaning, and make use only of common words, without any clear and determinate ideas': Hume 1739: p. 162; cf. 1748: p. 74.

<sup>60</sup> The momentousness of (the search for) intermediate steps seems to me to be likewise presupposed by many philosophers of science. For I think this idea is the basic rationale behind the frequently stressed conviction that the physical world is 'causally closed' (see, for instance, Hoche 2008: Essay V: sect. 2.3.2 with fn. 72, and sect. 2.5.3 with fn. 88), which for its part is a crucial constituent of many contemporary mainstream discussions of the mind-body problem (see, for instance, Bieri 1981: pp. 5, 9).

<sup>61</sup> See Essay IV: sect. 2.3.3 of Hoche 2008.

<sup>62</sup> See, for instance, Moore 1925: p. 40.

<sup>63</sup> Our language is imbued with 'numerical' traits. One of them is the linguistic fact that we have no alternative besides choosing between the grammatical 'numbers' *singular* and *plural*. For historical as well as for

'First- and third-person data can stand to each other in a causal relation.'. Then whoever takes the possibility of psychophysical interaction ('q') to be 'more certain' than the categorial character of the difference 'between' first- and third-person data ('p') cannot help denying the latter, that is, concluding that '¬p'; but whoever finds my arguments in favour of a categorial difference 'between' first-person and third-person data 'more certain' ('p') cannot help concluding that '¬q', and consequently has to look for a novel conceptual interpretation of the indubitable empirical phenomena of what at first sight seems to be 'psychophysical interaction'.

At present, I am neither willing nor in a position to go into any more details. Suffice it to say that certainly a lot of analytical work has still to be done in this field, and that a lot of conceptual distinctions are still waiting for being made.<sup>64</sup> What, more than hundred years ago, Moore has said in view of ethics is still worth heeding, and especially so with regard to our present problem:

[T]he work of analysis and distinction is often very difficult: we may often fail to make the necessary discovery, even though we make a definite attempt to do so. But I am inclined to think that in many cases a resolute attempt would be sufficient to ensure success; so that, if only this attempt were made, many of the most glaring difficulties and disagreements in philosophy would disappear. At all events, philosophers seem, in general, not to make the attempt; and, whether in consequence of this omission or not, they are constantly endeavouring to prove that 'Yes' or 'No' will answer questions, to which *neither* answer is correct, owing to the fact that what they have before their minds is not one question, but several, to some of which the true answer is 'No', to others 'Yes'.<sup>65</sup>

Thinking about the implications of these words should also prevent us from rashly discarding the research project of anthropological complementarity proper.

## 6. The human and the divine points of view

**6.1.** Let me conclude this essay with calling your attention to still another intriguing case of transforming amazement into insight. One of Aristotle's own examples of philosophical amazement is the problem of the origin of the universe ('g nesis to  pant s': *Metaphysics*, 982<sup>b</sup>17). In broadly this sense, Leibniz posed the famous question: 'Why is there something rather than nothing?', which Heidegger later on declared to be the basic question of metaphysics.<sup>66</sup> However, the justification for asking this question which Leibniz immediately added – 'Car le rien est plus simple et plus facile que quelque chose.' ('For the Nothing is simpler and more facile than something.') – seems to me to break down in view of the fact that we can show, by means of the method of free

---

conceptual reasons, even having at our disposal the ancient (or partly obsolete, partly obsolescent) '*dual* number' would be of no help whatsoever. Another one is the fact that we cannot possibly avoid saying that an entity '*a*' and an entity '*b*' which differ categorially stand to 'each other' in this unique relation, or that the categorial difference obtains 'between' the 'one' and the 'other'. These facts certainly help explain why it is so difficult to mentally get hold of the unique relation of a *categorial*, i.e., *non-numerical* difference. But we should not allow language to take us hostage.

<sup>64</sup> One of these distinctions certainly has to be made between the supposed interaction between conscious experiences (such as perceiving) and their alleged neural correlates on the one hand and the supposed interaction between mental dispositions (such as expecting relief) and occurrences taking place in the biological body (such as the reduction of swelling) on the other; see sect. 5.2 with fn. 50, above.

<sup>65</sup> Moore 1903: p. vii (Moore's italics).

<sup>66</sup> Leibniz 1714: p. 602, § 7: 'Pourquoi il y a plut t quelque chose que rien?'; Heidegger 1929: pp. 20 f., 38.



phenomenological variation,<sup>67</sup> that even in our fully unrestricted imagination we do not succeed in conceiving of something like 'the Nothing' ('le rien') as the mere negative of the being of the world. That nonetheless one is frequently tempted to believe that it is easier to conceive the existence of nothing than the existence of something, and that Leibniz thought he could base a cosmological argument for the existence of God ('argumentum a contingentia mundi') on this alleged fact, now seems to be amazing to *me*; but again I think we can change this amazement into an insight into a necessity of sorts – if only the insight into a psychological or anthropological compulsion we cannot easily get rid of. What I have in mind is our deeply ingrained addiction, resulting perhaps from false modesty which, in philosophising, is a bad adviser, to view ourselves and the world not from our native and natural human standpoint – to wit, as being the correlate of each one's own noematic, 'transcendentally constituting' consciousness – but to adopt instead, as it were, an extramundane 'view from nowhere', or from 'God's eye's' position.<sup>68</sup> By thus changing, more or less unwittingly, our points of view, we make ourselves believe, for instance, that the earth (not to speak of ourselves) is but a dust particle in the universe, or that our own personal problems are so insignificant as to be negligible – or, to return to the case under consideration, that it must be an enormous and virtually infeasible task to create the world from nothing ('ex nihilo').<sup>69</sup>

**6.2.** It should be added, however, that 'the view from nowhere'<sup>70</sup> is certainly the natural perspective to be taken by the 'positive' sciences, which, in contradistinction to philosophy, need and should (under pain of becoming intractable) not take into account the, as it were, transcendental 'umbilical cord' of the physical world. From this purely scientific point of view – which, by the way, should not be mixed up with what I called the 'third-person perspective' –, it is certainly quite appropriate to think that the world takes priority over consciousness of non-human and human animals and that the latter (just as organic life) gradually 'emerges' from (inorganic) matter in the course of evolution. As viewed from this angle, the whole well-known story about the evolution of the universe, of life, and of the species should, I think, be accepted without ifs and buts – pending, of course, further scientific progress and corrections necessitated by it. But we have to tell quite a different story once we adopt the philosophical point of view. For if we do so (or, to use the more appropriate singular form: if *I*, for one, do so), I cannot even *imagine* the material world in separation from my noematic and bodily structured<sup>71</sup> consciousness – just as little as I can imagine, say, a perception of mine in separation from a material object and the material world,<sup>72</sup> of which I am the centre or zero point.<sup>73</sup> If we adopt, however, the purely scientific point

<sup>67</sup> See sect. 2.2 with fn. 12, above, and Hoche 2008: Introduction, sect. 11.

<sup>68</sup> I think we may reasonably say that this is precisely the view which Husserl wanted to overcome by applying the method of what he called 'transcendental' or 'phenomenological reduction'. After Kant's conception of 'phenomena' as opposed to 'things-in-themselves' (cf. Essay V: sects. 1.7.2 and 1.8.1–1.8.2 of Hoche 2008), this method of Husserl's seems to me to be the second epoch-making attempt to replace philosophising from a divine point of view with philosophising from a human – and, in the end, from each one's own – point of view, which is, I take it, the only one we can reliably adopt in doing philosophy.

<sup>69</sup> I elaborated on this question in Hoche 1983: sect. VIII.

<sup>70</sup> This is, of course, an allusion to Nagel 1986.

<sup>71</sup> See sect. 2.2, above.

<sup>72</sup> The latter we may, I think, aptly define as being the all-embracing and in principle unbounded 'outside horizon' ('Aussenhorizont') of any arbitrarily chosen material object. This conception, and also the technical term, go back to Husserl; see, e.g., Husserl 1913, tr. 1931: §§ 27, 47; 1923–1924: pp. 145–152; 1929: § 19; 1934–1937: pp. 160–162, 165; 1948: §§ 8, 33. Defining the world this way seems to me to be at least

of view, then we have to do with an abstract, theoretically constructed, centre-less universe which is neither *my* nor *your* personal world;<sup>74</sup> and this universe of science may well be taken to have existed before I was born and to persist after my death.<sup>75</sup> From this point of view, which is rightly adopted by scientists but wrongly usurped by 'neurophilosophers', human and animal consciousness depends on the world. From a non-abstract ontological point of view, however, which endeavours to do justice to the full wealth of the concrete phenomena (or, in this sense, 'to save the phenomena'), each one's noematic world in a way depends on his or her 'transcendentally constituting' consciousness. On the whole, both perspectives, the philosophical and the scientific ones, should be taken to have equal rights, if each in its proper field – just as the first- and the third-person perspectives (which, as we cannot stress frequently enough, must not be mixed up with the other pair of perspectives) do not contradict but fruitfully complement each other and hence deserve to be equally respected.

### Bibliographical References

- ANSCOMBE, G. E. M. 1957: *Intention*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- AUSTIN, John Langshaw 1962: *Sense and Sensibilia*. Reconstructed from the manuscript notes by G. J. Warnock. Oxford University Press paperback, 1964.
- BIERI, Peter (ed.) 1981: *Analytische Philosophie des Geistes* [Analytic philosophy of mind]. Königstein (Tanus): Hain.
- BIRNBACHER, Dieter 1974: *Die Logik der Kriterien. Analysen zur Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins* [The logic of criteria. Analyses concerning Wittgenstein's later philosophy]. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- HASHISH, I., FINMAN, C., & HARVEY, W. 1988: Reduction of postoperative pain and swelling by ultrasound: a placebo effect. In: *Pain* 83 (1988) 303–311.
- HEIDEGGER, Martin 1929: *Was ist Metaphysik?* [What is metaphysics?]. Sixth edition, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951.
- HOCHE, Hans-Ulrich 1964: *Nichtempirische Erkenntnis. Analytische und synthetische Urteile a priori bei Kant und bei Husserl* [Non-empirical knowledge. Kant and Husserl on analytical and synthetic judgements a priori]. Meisenheim am Glan: Hain.
- 1973: *Handlung, Bewusstsein und Leib. Vorstudien zu einer rein noematischen Phänomenologie* [Action, consciousness, and (the functioning) body. Preliminary studies concerning a purely noematic phenomenology]. Freiburg & Munich: Karl Alber.
  - 1983: Philosophisches Staunen und phänomenologische Variation [Philosophical amazement and phenomenological variation]. In: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 65 (1983) 283–305.

---

as fertile as defining it as the totality of the facts or existing states of affairs (Wittgenstein 1922: 1.1, 1.2, 2.04) – not to speak of the totality of objects. For instance, I think that the 'horizontal structure' of perception and imagination can be made use of in a promising way if we want to deal with the sophisticated traditional problems of substance and causation; see Hoche 1964: §§ 28–29; 1983: sects. VII–VIII; 1990: sects. 10.5–10.6. But note that Wittgenstein's conception of the world is fruitful, too. For instance, in Essay IV: sect. 3.11, fn. 115, of Hoche 2008 I made use of the fact that normally we intentionally refer, not to single objects, but to constellations of objects, or states of affairs. See also *ibid.*: sect. 3.2, where I stated that whenever I can be said to see a thing (a body, animated or not), I can be said to see that something is the case, and vice versa.

<sup>73</sup> See sect. 2.2, above, and Hoche 1973: pp. 33 f., 226–228, 328 f.

<sup>74</sup> In somewhat this sense, Husserl and others have distinguished between the 'world of science' and our 'life-world(s)'.

<sup>75</sup> Cf. Essay V: sect. 2.8 of Hoche 2008.

- 1990: *Einführung in das sprachanalytische Philosophieren* [Introduction to doing philosophy in a linguistic key]. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
  - 1994: Zur Komplementarität von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit des menschlichen Handelns [On the complementarity of freedom and necessity in human action]. In: *Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics* 2 (1994) 37–54.
  - 2004: In Search of an Integrated Logic of Conviction and Intention. In: *Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik / Annual Review of Law and Ethics* 12 (2004) 401–434.
  - 2008: *Anthropological Complementarism. Linguistic, Logical, and Phenomenological Studies in Support of a Third Way Beyond Dualism and Monism*. Paderborn: mentis.
  - & STRUBE, Werner 1985: *Analytische Philosophie* [Analytical philosophy]. Freiburg & Munich: Karl Alber (= *Handbuch Philosophie*, ed. by E. Ströker & W. Wieland, Vol. 6).
- HRÓBJARTSSON, A. & GØTZSCHE, P. C. 2001: Is the placebo powerless? An analysis of clinical trials comparing placebo with no treatment. In: *New England Journal of Medicine* 344/21 (2001) 1594–1602.
- HUME, David 1739: *A Treatise of Human Nature*, London. New edition by L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon, 1888, reprinted 1967.
- 1748: *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, London. New edition by L. A. Selby-Bigge: *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1888, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. 1975.
- HUSSERL, Edmund 1907: *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* [The idea of phenomenology]. Ed. by Walter Biemel, The Hague: Nijhoff 1958 (HUSSERLIANA, Vol. II).
- 1913, tr. 1931: *Ideas. General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, tr. by W. R. Boyce Gibson. London, 1931. Collier Books, New York, 1962. – German original: *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Vol. I. Halle, 1913. Republished by Walter Biemel, The Hague: Nijhoff 1950 (HUSSERLIANA, Vol. III).
  - 1923–1924: *Erste Philosophie (1923/24)*, II: *Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion* [First philosophy (1923/24), II: Theory of phenomenological reduction]. Ed. by Rudolf Boehm, The Hague: Nijhoff 1959 (HUSSERLIANA, Vol. VIII).
  - 1929: *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge* [Cartesian meditations and Paris lectures]. Ed. by S. Strasser, The Hague: Nijhoff 1950 (HUSSERLIANA, Vol. I).
  - 1934–1937: *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie* [The crisis of the European sciences, and transcendental phenomenology. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy]. Ed. by Walter Biemel, The Hague; Nijhoff 1954 (HUSSERLIANA, Vol. VI).
  - 1948: *Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik* [Experience and judgement. Enquiries into the genealogy of logic]. Arranged and ed. by Ludwig Landgrebe. Hamburg: Claassen 1948.
- LEIBNIZ, Gottfried Wilhelm 1714: *Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, fondés en raison*. Reprinted in: *Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz*, ed. by C. J. Gerhardt, Vol. VI, pp. 598–606.
- MACINTYRE, A. 1969: A Mistake about Causality in Social Science. In: P. Laslett & W. Runciman (eds.), *Philosophy, Politics, and Society*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Series, Oxford 1969, pp. 48–70.
- MALCOLM, Norman 1959: *Dreaming*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 4<sup>th</sup> impression, 1967.
- MOORE, George Edward 1903: *Principia Ethica*. Cambridge University Press.
- 1925: A Defence of Common Sense. Reprinted in: Moore 1959, pp. 32–59.
  - 1954–1955: Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930–33. Reprinted in: Moore 1959, pp. 252–324.
  - 1959: *Philosophical Papers*. London & New York: Allen & Unwin/Macmillan.
- NAGEL, Thomas 1986: *The View From Nowhere*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- PASCAL, Blaise 1669: *Pensées*. Édition de Ch.-M. des Granges. Paris: Garnier 1964. 277–336.
- RYLE, Gilbert 1951: Ludwig Wittgenstein. Reprinted in: Ryle, *Collected Papers*. Vol. I: *Critical Essays*, London 1971, pp. 249–257.

- SARTRE, Jean-Paul 1936–1937: La transcendance de l'égo. Esquisse d'une description phénoménologique [The transcendence of the ego. Outline of a phenomenological description]. In: *Recherches philosophiques* 6 (1936–1937) 85–123.
- 1943: *L'être et le néant* [Being and nothingness]. Paris.
- SEARLE, John R. 1983: *Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge University Press.
- SEIFERT, Josef 1973: *Leib und Seele. Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen Anthropologie* [Body and soul. A contribution to philosophical anthropology]. Salzburg & Munich: Anton Pustet.
- STEGMÜLLER, Wolfgang 1969: *Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie, Band I: Wissenschaftliche Erklärung und Begründung* [Problems and results of the philosophy of science and analytic philosophy, Vol. I: Scientific explanation and justification]. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer.
- STRAWSON, Peter Frederick 1959: *Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*. London: Methuen. University Paperback 1964, reprinted 1969.
- VELMANS, Max 2002: How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains? In: *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 9 (2002) 3–29.
- 1996 (ed.): *The Science of Consciousness. Psychological, Neuropsychological and Clinical Reviews*. London & New York: Routledge.
- WALL, Patrick D. 1996: The placebo effect. In: Velmans 1996, pp. 162–180.
- WEBER, Max 1913: Über einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie [On some categories of a sociology based on understanding]. In: Weber 1922, pp. 427–474.
- 1921: Soziologische Grundbegriffe [Some basic concepts of sociology]. Reprinted in: Weber 1922, pp. 541–581.
  - 1922: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* [Collected papers on the theory of science]. 3<sup>rd</sup>, enlarged edition, ed. by Johannes Winkelmann, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1968.
- WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig 1922: *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*. London. Republished with a new translation by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. London, 1961.

\*

*Erstpublikation in: Hans-Ulrich Hoche: Anthropological Complementarism. Linguistic, Logical, and Phenomenological Studies in Support of a Third Way Beyond Dualism and Monism. Paderborn: mentis, 2008. S. 241–263 (Essay VI). Querverweise auf andere Abschnitte dieses Buches wurden in der vorliegenden Separatfassung sinngemäß abgeändert. Wiederveröffentlicht mit freundlicher Genehmigung des Verlages.*

\* \*